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a b s t r a c t 
Testing is widely seen as one core element of a successful strategy to curtail the COVID-19 pandemic 
and many countries have increased their effort s to provide testing at large scale. As most democratic 
governments refrain from enacting mandatory testing, a key emerging challenge is to increase voluntary 
participation. Using behavioural economics insights complemented with data from a novel survey in the 
US and a survey experiment in Luxembourg, we examine behavioural factors associated with the indi- 
vidual willingness to get tested (WTT). In our analysis, individual characteristics that correlate positively 
with WTT include age, altruism, conformism, the tendency to abide by government-imposed rules, con- 
cern about contracting COVID-19, and patience. Risk aversion, unemployment, and conservative political 
orientation correlate negatively with WTT. Building on and expanding these insights may prove fruitful 
for policy to effectively raise people’s propensity to get tested. 
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
Background 
Recent research has highlighted the role of extensive testing in 
monitoring the COVID-19 pandemic [ 32 , 38 ]. As part of an active 
monitoring strategy, citizens may be invited to submit to testing 
for at least one of three purposes: (i) testing of the entire popula- 
tion, (ii) testing a sample to monitor the spread of the pandemic, 
or (iii) testing of individuals who were in contact with a posi- 
tive COVID-19 case to break infection chains. Peto et al. [29] argue 
that weekly COVID-19 testing with strict household quarantine and 
contact tracing could be sufficient to end the pandemic (see also 
[35] , and [30] ). Burzynski et al. [8] show in simulation exercises 
how testing may act as an important element of a broader strat- 
egy to curtail COVID-19 infections. Despite the enormous expected 
health and economic gains associated with frequent and exten- 
sive testing [ 3 , 8 , 13 ], capacity constraints can limit the implemen- 
tation of such a strategy. Consequently, an increasing amount of 
work discusses the optimal allocation of (inevitably limited) test- 
ing resources (e.g. [11] ) and how COVID-19-testing strategies could 
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usefully draw on the experience with former successful disease 
screening programs [31] . 
The success of any testing strategy depends on people’s will- 
ingness to participate [28] . In some rare exceptions this success 
is achieved by imposing relevant threats to noncompliant citizens, 
as in the Slovakian example that achieved a close to 100% partic- 
ipation rate by imposing quarantine for those not willing to get 
tested [27] . However, most democratic governments hitherto pre- 
fer to rely on voluntary participation. Early evidence from one 
(small) country – i.e. Luxembourg – that embarked on the first 
full-population testing strategy points to limited take-up of testing: 
during the first phase of the large-scale testing in 2020, less than 
40% of the over 1.40 0.0 0 0 invitations were taken up. These tests 
accounted for 26% of all the detected positive cases in Luxembourg, 
indicating the scope for a higher participation rate to improve the 
effectiveness of the testing strategy [37] . 
The take-up of a given voluntary testing offer may not only 
be too small, but may also face systematic selection bias, if the 
propensity to get tested varies with particular individual character- 
istics, including the participant’s likelihood of being infected with 
COVID-19. From an economic perspective, the individual decision 
to get tested is likely to depend on perceived personal costs and 
benefits. In addition, there are non-personal benefits that accrue 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2021.05.003 
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at the societal level, as the government’s testing strategy may im- 
prove its ability to effectively control the pandemic. 
This positive externality may not be taken into account by the 
individual. Such misalignment of incentives creates a classic collec- 
tive action problem : society as a whole is better off, if the invited 
people get tested, but the individually rational action is to not get 
tested (and hope everybody else does). Paradoxically, the problem 
intensifies as strategies to manage and contain the spread of the 
virus become more successful: if the chances of contracting an in- 
fection are relatively small, so are the expected personal benefits 
from knowing one’s health status, seeking healthcare and protect- 
ing others. The above example from Luxembourg may illustrate the 
need of aligning the societal with the individual benefits to reach 
a number of individuals willing to get tested that is closer to the 
socially optimal level. 
Understanding people’s incentives for or against taking a test 
may help guide the roll-out and accompanying communication of 
a successful testing initiative. To date, the literature analyzing indi- 
vidual determinants of the willingness to get tested for COVID-19 
remains scarce. In a survey with 897 participants in the US, Thun- 
ström et al. [36] design a treatment to proxy for low vs high self- 
isolation costs. They find that around 70% of respondents would 
accept an invitation for a free test, with no significant difference 
across treatments. Younger individuals and people with a high 
number of personal interactions in their daily lives are the most 
willing to take a test. Individuals with health insurance are more 
likely to accept the test than those without – a result that the 
authors ascribe to “willful ignorance”. They further find individu- 
als that identify themselves as Republicans to be less willing to 
get tested, while those worried about their health status are more 
willing. Finally, an individual’s financial and emotional capacity to 
sustain self-isolation does not seem to affect the willingness to get 
tested. 
Stillman and Tonin [34] rely on administrative data to analyze 
community-based determinants of actual test take-up in the con- 
text of a population-wide testing campaign in the region of South 
Tyrol in November 2020. They find that communities characterized 
by older, more educated, more female and larger households had 
higher testing rates. The number of testing centers also had a pos- 
itive and significant correlation with testing rates, even after con- 
trolling for population and population density, suggesting that the 
convenience of the testing procedure had a significant impact. In 
addition, communities with higher shares of religious marriages 
also had higher testing rates, whereas proxies for social cohesion 
do not exhibit a significant relationship. 
In this paper, we contribute to the scarce evidence base by ex- 
ploring the determinants of individual willingness to participate 
in testing. Using a survey with a set of experimentally validated 
measures of individual preferences in the United States, we an- 
alyze how individual preferences and socio-demographic charac- 
teristics relate to the willingness to get tested (WTT). In a sec- 
ond experimental study, conducted during the onset of Luxem- 
bourg’s large-scale testing program in early June 2020, we show 
how information about the type of test used (i.e. mouth vs nasal 
swab testing) affects WTT, in a context where individuals per- 
ceive relatively low personal returns but a varying discomfort 
from the two types of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing. 
Among other results, we find that in the US, age, identifying as 
democrat, being worried about contracting the virus and hav- 
ing a habit of following the rules is associated with a higher 
WTT. Regarding individual preferences, we find that altruism, con- 
formism and risk-seeking are linked to a higher WTT. In the Dis- 
cussion section, we use these results and embed them into the 
broader related literature in non-COVID-19 contexts, in order to 
discuss several potential challenges and important channels that 
policymakers may want to consider in their effort s to reduce 
individual costs and increase individual benefits associated with 
testing. 
Methods 
We implemented two separate and independent opt-in surveys 
to collect our data: an online survey among a sample of US cit- 
izens (US-sample, N = 1213) and an online-survey experiment 
among students of the University of Luxembourg (LUX-sample, 
N = 127). The US-sample comprises respondents from 50 different 
US states who were recruited in mid-June 2020, via the online sur- 
vey platform CloudResearch, from the Turkprime panel. This panel 
was chosen because of the heterogeneity among its respondents 
in terms of several sociodemographic dimensions, positioning it 
closer to the American National Electoral Study than other online 
platforms [10] . Subjects in the LUX-sample were recruited from an 
internal database using the platform ORSEE [18] . 
To explore potential determinants of the willingness to submit 
to testing, both of our surveys contain an item that asks respon- 
dents to state their willingness to accept a free PCR test. We use 
this item to code our dependent variable, willingness to get tested 
(WTT), which takes on the value 1 if the individual states to def- 
initely or likely take a free test offered by the government and 0 
otherwise. For the US-sample, we use several well-identified and 
validated measures of behavioural traits from the behavioural eco- 
nomics literature [14] as our main explanatory variables of inter- 
est. These measures have been established as robust predictors of 
between- and within-country variation of various preferences and 
economic outcomes and behaviours [15] . We include items that we 
hypothesized would be related to WTT, such as risk-aversion, al- 
truism, and patience. Following recent advances in economics in- 
vestigating the influence of individual preferences to comply with 
norms on behaviour (for an overview, see [17] ), we also include a 
novel survey question capturing conformism. We would expect in- 
dividuals that are more risk averse, more altruistic, more patient 
and more conformist to display a higher propensity to get tested. 
We also include questions about the perceptions of the COVID- 
19 pandemic, e.g. on how respondents evaluate the current spread 
of the virus where they live (see Appendix A). Other things equal, 
we would expect a self-perceived faster spread of the virus to 
increase the respondents’ willingness to get tested. In line with 
related WTT research (e.g. [36] ), we also include standard socio- 
demographic variables, as they may shape people’s preferences for 
testing. For instance, with rising age, and hence rising risk to suf- 
fer severe consequences from an infection, individual WTT should 
increase; people with higher educational attainment and higher in- 
comes should be more willing to get tested, as they would perceive 
lower private costs of doing so, among others due to being better 
placed to cope with self-isolation, in case of a positive test result. 
We use the US-sample to explore the link between the above- 
mentioned behavioural variables and WTT, because it is a relatively 
large and heterogenous sample that offers ample variation in our 
variables of interest. By contrast, since our LUX-sample is relatively 
small and homogenous, we set-up a survey experiment to explore 
how another behavioural aspect impacts on WTT, the anticipation 
of physical discomfort experienced during the test. We ran this 
survey experiment during the first week of June 2020, before stu- 
dents could receive an invitation from the large-scale testing initia- 
tive. We randomize about half of our respondents into a treatment 
showing them a picture describing a nose-swab test alongside the 
WTT question, and the other half into a treatment showing them 
a mouth-swab test. This treatment was motivated by discussion in 
the public sphere about the discomfort of the nose swab (see e.g. 
[26] ) and initial confusion about the method used within the large- 
scale testing. 
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Table 1 
Willingness to get tested: Average marginal effects from probit regressions (US-sample). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age .003 (.001) ∗∗∗ .003 (.001) ∗∗∗ .003 (.001) ∗∗∗ .003 (.001) ∗∗∗
LowincTRUE -.017 (.037) -.023 (.037) -.036 (.038) -.019 (.037) 
Edu_lowTRUE -.061 (.041) -.066 (.041) -.074 (.043) ∗ -.061 (.041) 
Edu_highTRUE -.041 (.040) -.064 (.039) -.065 (.041) -.049 (.040) 
RetiredTRUE -.048 (.043) -.048 (.043) -.051 (.044) -.042 (.043) 
Self-empTRUE -.070 (.058) -.066 (.058) -.066 (.060) -.066 (.058) 
UnempTRUE -.065 (.033) ∗ -.061 (.034) ∗ -.063 (.034) ∗ -.060 (.034) ∗
Altruism .019 (.006) ∗∗∗ .020 (.006) ∗∗∗ .020 (.006) ∗∗∗ .019 (.006) ∗∗∗
Conformism .012 (.004) ∗∗∗ .010 (.004) ∗∗ .010 (.005) ∗∗ .011 (.004) ∗∗
WorriedTRUE .179 (.027) ∗∗∗ .175 (.027) ∗∗∗ .173 (.027) ∗∗∗ .181 (.027) ∗∗∗
FollowrulesTRUE .187 (.032) ∗∗∗ .195 (.032) ∗∗∗ .200 (.033) ∗∗∗ .188 (.032) ∗∗∗
Risktolerance .014 (.005) ∗∗∗ .015 (.005) ∗∗∗ .013 (.005) ∗∗ .014 (.005) ∗∗∗
Patience .011 (.006) ∗ .009 (.006) .008 (.006) .011 (.006) ∗
RepublicanTRUE -.061 (.027) ∗∗ -.062 (.027) ∗∗ -.055 (.028) ∗∗ -.061 (.027) ∗∗
State Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO 
State Random Intercepts NO NO NO YES 
Full Sample YES YES NO YES 
AIC 1376.904 1405.818 1325.872 1373.547 
BIC 1453.417 1732.273 1568.485 1455.161 
Log Likelihood -673.452 -638.909 -614.936 -670.774 
Deviance 1346.904 1277.818 1229.872 
Num. obs. 1213 1213 1158 1213 
Average marginal effects and standard errors (reported in parentheses) are obtained from probit regressions with self-reported willing- 
ness to get tested for an active COVID-19 infection as dependent variable. Regression results in column 2 are obtained by additionally 
including state fixed effects to the regression shown in column 1. Column 3 shows results from a smaller sample excluding respon- 
dents from states with less than 5 observations. Column 4 shows results from a multilevel probit model including random slopes for 
the federal states. Stars indicate statistical significance at 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
In what follows, we make regular reference to the main re- 
sults from the two separate analyses, i.e., a set of probit regres- 
sions of WTT on individual characteristics for the US-sample, and 
a between-treatments comparison of the WTT conditional on the 
type of testing for the LUX-sample, using a test of proportions for 
independent observations ( χ2 test). In Appendix B, we provide a 
short technical description of the Probit model and report in Ap- 
pendix Table 4 the descriptive statistics of the two samples with 
respect to age, gender and the individual characteristics elicited. 
Results 
Table 1 below presents the main results from our US-sample. 
Several individual characteristics are correlated with WTT, and 
these results hold under different model specifications, including 
after controlling for state-level fixed effects (Model 2) and after ex- 
clusion of states with few observations (Model 3). ( Table 2 ) 
As expected, WTT is increasing in age . The average effect is 
small (one additional year of age is associated with a 0.3 per- 
centage point increase in the willingness to get tested), but highly 
significant. The socioeconomic situation of the individual matters 
in so far as WTT is lower among those on low incomes, among 
those with lower levels of educational attainment and among the 
retired and self-employed (though not statistically significantly so 
for any of these, p = 0.64 for low income, p = 0.15 for low level 
of education, p = 0.26 for retired respondents, p = 0.22 for the 
self-employed). Being unemployed significantly decreases individ- 
ual WTT (p = 0.051). Results are robust across different model 
specifications. 
The majority of the behavioural questions help explain people’s 
WTT in the expected direction: a higher level of altruism is associ- 
ated with higher WTT. A one-point increase on the experimentally 
validated, 10-point altruism scale [14] entails an average increase 
of 2 percentage-points in WTT. Similarly, using a novel survey item 
to measure individual valuation of gaining other people’s approval 
(conformism), we find that a one-point increase on the (10-point) 
conformism scale is associated with an average increase of one 
percentage-point in WTT. Being worried about the situation is as- 
sociated with a substantially higher WTT; people who report that 
they are worried about contracting COVID-19 on average report an 
18-percentage-point higher WTT. Similarly, people who generally 
follow the rules imposed by the government, show a substantially 
higher WTT ( + 19 percentage points). 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we find that individuals who 
are more risk-seeking report a significantly higher WTT. This could 
indicate that WTT increases in individuals’ self-assessed likelihood 
of having contracted an infection, which should in fact be lower 
among the risk-averse who avoid most situations that bear an el- 
evated infection risk. The findings of Thunström et al. [36] are in 
line with this interpretation, showing that respondents who have 
sought higher risk and met more people during the three days 
preceding the survey are significantly more willing to get tested. 
A second finding emerging from our analysis that complements 
this interpretation is the observation that higher levels of patience 
are associated with a significantly higher WTT, presumably because 
more patient individuals find it easier to forgo the present-day re- 
wards that lie in risky interactions for the sake of future health. 
Finally, individuals who classify their political orientation as Re- 
publican are significantly less willing to get tested (-6 percentage 
points). The finding is in line with recent evidence showing that 
Republicans tend to perceive the dangers associated with a COVID- 
19 infection as less severe than Democrats [ 2 , 7 ]. This suggests that 
Republicans perceive the dangers of an (undetected) COVID-19 in- 
fection as lower relative to non-Republicans, possibly leading them 
to attach a lower value to knowing their infection status. 
In our LUX-sample, we examine how WTT is affected by the 
type of test to be performed, comparing the scenarios of a mouth 
swab versus a nasal swab. Overall, we find that the mouth swab 
increases willingness to get tested by more than 40 percentage- 
points compared to the nasal swab (78% vs. 37%, χ2 (1) = 21.75, p- 
value: < 0.001 ). A commonly reported motive as to why respon- 
dents in the nasal treatment expressed doubts or unwillingness to 
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Table 2 
Willingness to get tested: Probit regression results. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Intercept) -1.455 (.262) ∗∗∗ -1.126 (.295) ∗∗∗ -1.062 (.300) ∗∗∗ -1.481 (.266) ∗∗∗
Age .010 (.003) ∗∗∗ .011 (.003) ∗∗∗ .011 (.003) ∗∗∗ .010 (.003) ∗∗∗
LowincomeTRUE -.055 (.115) -.078 (.121) -.117 (.122) -.060 (.117) 
Edu_lowTRUE -.190 (.129) -.220 (.136) -.242 (.139) ∗ -.195 (.130) 
Edu_highTRUE -.132 (.129) -.217 (.136) -.219 (.139) -.160 (.130) 
RetiredTRUE -.153 (.137) -.162 (.143) -.170 (.146) -.135 (.138) 
Self-empTRUE -.216 (.173) -.216 (.184) -.214 (.190) -.204 (.176) 
UnempTRUE -.207 (.107) ∗ -.204 (.113) ∗ -.211 (.114) ∗ -.194 (.109) ∗
Altruism .060 (.018) ∗∗∗ .067 (.019) ∗∗∗ .066 (.019) ∗∗∗ .063 (.018) ∗∗∗
Conformism .038 (.014) ∗∗∗ .033 (.015) ∗∗ .033 (.015) ∗∗ .035 (.014) ∗∗
WorriedTRUE .597 (.099) ∗∗∗ .614 (.103) ∗∗∗ .604 (.104) ∗∗∗ .612 (.100) ∗∗∗
FollowingrulesTRUE .550 (.091) ∗∗∗ .604 (.096) ∗∗∗ .613 (.097) ∗∗∗ .557 (.093) ∗∗∗
Risktolerance .046 (.016) ∗∗∗ .050 (.017) ∗∗∗ .042 (.017) ∗∗ .046 (.016) ∗∗∗
Patience .034 (.019) ∗ .031 (.020) .028 (.020) .034 (.019) ∗
RepublicanTRUE -.192 (.086) ∗∗ -.204 (.089) ∗∗ -.181 (.091) ∗∗ -.192 (.087) ∗∗
State Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO 
State Random Intercepts NO NO NO YES 
Full Sample YES YES NO YES 
AIC 1376.904 1405.818 1325.872 1373.547 
BIC 1453.417 1732.273 1568.485 1455.161 
Log Likelihood -673.452 -638.909 -614.936 -670.774 
Deviance 1346.904 1277.818 1229.872 
Num. obs. 1213 1213 1158 1213 
Coefficients and standard errors (reported in parantheses) are obtained from probit regressions with self-reported willingness to get 
tested for an active COVID-19 infection as dependent variable. Regression results in column 2 are obtained by additionally including 
state fixed effects to the regression shown in column 1. Column 3 shows results from a smaller sample excluding respondents from 
states with less than 5 observations. Column 4 shows results from a multilevel probit model including random slopes for the federal 
states. Stars indicate statistical significance at 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
Table 3 
Willingness to get tested in LUX-sample: Probit regression results 
(coefficients and average marginal effects). 
Coefficients AMEs 
(Intercept) .366 (.851) 
treatmentmouth 1.167 (.248) ∗∗∗ .422 (.079) ∗∗∗
risktolerance -.042 (.049) -.014 (.016) 
altruism -.004 (.058) -.001 (.019) 
conformism -.035 (.043) -.012 (.014) 
patience .058 (.054) .019 (.018) 
age -.015 (.026) -.005 (.008) 
worriedTRUE .104 (.262) .034 (.087) 
followingrulesTRUE -.397 (.387) -.128 (.119) 
AIC 166.512 
BIC 192.109 
Log Likelihood -74.256 
Deviance 148.512 
Num. obs. 127 
Coefficients (Column 1), Average Marginal Effects (column 2) and 
standard errors (reported in parantheses) are obtained from probit 
regressions with self-reported willingness to get tested for an active 
COVID-19 infection as dependent variable. Stars indicate statistical 
significance at ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1. 
get tested is the invasiveness of the procedure and possible pain. 
In the mouth treatment, participants exert much less reluctance to 
get tested to begin with. Among the few that are reluctant, com- 
mon concerns relate to the usefulness of the test, given their (per- 
ceived) low risk of infection. The LUX-sample also answered to a 
similar set of questions as the US-sample. We report in Table 3 in 
Appendix B a similar analysis as for Table 1 . Note that the treat- 
ment difference is strongly significant after controlling for individ- 
ual characteristics. 
Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the implications of our empirical re- 




Age 47.7 (18.2) 25.8 (4.8) 
Fraction of women 0.63 (0.48) 0.60 (0.49) 
Risk tolerance 5.76 (2.80) 5.15 (2.70) 
Altruism 8.13 (2.38) 7.47 (2.21) 
Conformism 5.58 (3.08) 5.31 (2.87) 
Patience 7.94 (2.31) 6.82 (2.32) 
N 1213 127 
(under-researched) COVID-19 context and in the broadly related lit- 
erature outside COVID-19, with a view to identifying several po- 
tential aspects that policymakers interested in increasing the effec- 
tiveness of their testing strategy might want to take into account. 
We do so by organizing our and other researchers’ findings, using 
a (behavioural) economic framework. Accordingly, we assume – as 
a first approximation of real-word decision-making – that people 
act “rationally”, as if they weigh their personal (monetary and non- 
monetary) costs and benefits of testing and ultimately choose the 
course of action that yields the highest expected net benefits. The 
so identified private costs and benefits may represent useful pol- 
icy targets or channels, in the sense that testing policies can be 
designed with the aim of reducing perceived costs or increasing 
expected benefits from getting tested. 
The expected costs comprise both the monetary and non- 
monetary costs of taking the test. Policies designed to keep costs 
as low as possible need to consider several dimensions: 
Monetary costs need to be kept to a minimum, since even small 
increases can have detrimental effects on take-up rates [33] . This 
is relatively easy to achieve, if tests are administered free-of-charge 
and a sufficiently large number of test facilities are accessible, lim- 
iting individual travel costs. 
Convenience and safety. Other costs include, at the very least, 
the time spent at and travelling to the test facility, as well as the 
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expected physical discomfort associated with the test procedure. If 
people perceive an elevated risk of contracting an infection at the 
test facility, this presents an additional cost. Making testing con- 
venient and safe for test-takers will reduce individual costs asso- 
ciated with testing [34] – if at a higher cost to the government. 
In the case of testing technologies, the potential public costs of 
reducing the individual’s costs are somewhat difficult to predict. 
Apart from potential differences in prices that are easy to com- 
pare, testing technologies might also differ in accuracy. A higher 
rate of false-negative test results could reduce the effectiveness 
of the government’s testing effort s and thus induce a substantial 
cost with respect to controlling the spread of the virus. If more 
comfortable methods of testing have a higher risk of producing 
false-negative results than less comfortable ones (e.g. mouth vs. 
nose swab), governments might prefer the more accurate method. 
Yet, the potential loss in accuracy associated with adopting a more 
comfortable method for population-wide testing could be justified, 
if its availability leads to a significant gain in the fraction of peo- 
ple willing to undergo testing. The strategy followed by Luxem- 
bourg’s authorities after a slow start in test take-up was to clearly 
state in the invitation letter to participate in the large-scale test- 
ing that the test carried out would rely on a throat swab. In con- 
trast, nasal swab tests are prescribed to individuals with COVID-19 
symptoms or who have been in contact with a positive case. Our 
survey experiment, which was carried out at the onset of Luxem- 
bourg’s large-scale testing, does indeed indicate that the fear from 
physical discomfort has a substantially negative impact on WTT. 
Psychological costs. People may anticipate incurring psychologi- 
cal costs from a positive test result, based on fear about the health 
consequences [1] , or about potential social stigma [25] , depend- 
ing on the extent to which the outcome will be visible to others. 
Moreover, the psychological costs of (further) isolation maybe large 
[6] . Psychological costs from a positive diagnosis can be addressed 
in two ways: medical treatment including counselling upon a pos- 
itive diagnosis, as well as de-stigmatisation of positive individuals 
at the societal level. However, while counselling may well reduce 
the negative psychological impact of a positive diagnosis on those 
actually infected, it is unclear whether its provision will also re- 
duce the anticipated psychological impacts (and hence costs) of re- 
ceiving a positive diagnosis for those who have yet to get tested. 
Policy measures aimed at de-stigmatisation are more likely to re- 
duce the expected costs of a positive diagnosis, as for example 
public campaigns are noticeable also to the non-infected popula- 
tion. However, they walk a fine line between reducing fear of an 
infection and trivialisation of the disease, which in itself may re- 
duce the willingness to get tested [25] . 
Self-isolation upon testing positive. Our results and the exist- 
ing literature are inconclusive regarding the role of financial con- 
straints and economic status [ 34 , 36 ], [33] . On one hand, low- 
income individuals have a lower opportunity cost of an imposed 
quarantine, which could increase their willingness to get tested. 
On the other hand, a constrained budgetary situation might imply 
that quarantine would be financially unbearable, thereby reducing 
individual WTT. Since self-isolation would require further physical 
absence from work, or from school or university, potential indirect 
monetary losses may pile up. The question of how to reduce costs 
from self-isolation upon receiving a positive test result seems cru- 
cial to convince people to submit to testing, especially if testing 
is voluntary and isolation is mandatory in case of a positive test 
result. The testing strategy needs to consider the various ways in 
which self-isolation can induce costs and how compensation may 
best occur, while avoiding incentivising individuals to actively seek 
infection. This may include compensation for income loss, oppor- 
tunities for exam re-sits, or other suitable measures. 
The personal expected benefits are derived from knowing one’s 
current COVID-19 status, from pro-social preferences and social 
image concerns. Both monetary and non-monetary incentives can 
trigger willingness to get tested, but the effectiveness of these in- 
centives are likely to depend on the weight that each individual 
places on the different channels mentioned: 
Knowing one’s own health status . While individuals may differ 
in their valuation of knowing their health status, such knowledge 
will tend to allow them to (1) quickly eliminate uncertainty about 
their COVID-19-related health status; (2) benefit from healthcare 
at an early stage if infected, improving the odds of a quick recov- 
ery; (3) actively prevent infecting others in their immediate per- 
sonal environment, such as family and friends, as well as contacts 
in other relevant settings (work, school) and (4) obtain proof of no 
active infection, e.g. to avoid a quarantine when travelling inter- 
nationally or having been in contact with an active infection case. 
Our results show that being worried about contracting the virus 
increases WTT. Hence, it is important for the population to feel 
some concern though no panic about the pandemic. Communica- 
tion regarding the consequences of an infection and the disease 
control strategy, including testing, needs to be clear, fact-based and 
appear as trustworthy for individuals from different socio-cultural 
and political spectrums. Differences in WTT between Republican 
and Democrat voters in the US, highlighted by our results, under- 
line this necessity. 
Prosocial benefits . Testing can contribute to the benefits derived 
from protecting the health of loved ones and other members of so- 
ciety. Although Campos-Mercade et al. [9] do not specifically look 
at willingness to test, they find prosocial individuals to be more 
likely to follow health guidelines such as physical distancing, iso- 
lating at home when sick, or buying face masks. Our results also 
confirm that altruism is significantly correlated with WTT. It may 
thus be possible to trigger non-monetary incentives for testing, 
e.g., by appealing to people’s sense of solidarity or their desire to 
do good. 
Social image benefits. People may also benefit from doing what 
is regarded by others as “the right thing to do”. Research in other 
contexts has shown that social image concerns are an important 
motivator for individuals to vote [5] ; the prospect of telling others 
about whether or not one has voted increases the participation in 
elections [12] . Examples abound on how social norms can induce 
higher participation, by reminding people of the behaviour of oth- 
ers, neighbours, colleagues etc. [16] . In our US-sample, conformism 
seems indeed to increase willingness to get tested. In the context 
of COVID-19 testing, these results imply that sending a text mes- 
sage to inform people about, say, the number of people who sub- 
mitted to testing in the same neighbourhood during the past week 
could motivate individuals to submit to testing, too. 
Monetary benefits. A straightforward way of increasing expected 
benefits of test-taking would be to set monetary rewards for com- 
pliers. Such has been suggested in a recent opinion piece by Levitt 
et al. [24] , proposing a COVID lottery that gives away large prizes 
every week to random test participants, where a completed test 
would allow participation in the lottery, with winners announced 
at regular intervals. Levitt et al. also recommend a second financial 
incentive for anyone who tests positive for COVID-19 and is thus 
required to stay home. Whether such an approach can be effective 
remains an open question. Evidence from previous uses of lotter- 
ies show limited or no effect, for instance in the case of promoting 
voter turnout in London [20] , or take-up rates of cancer screen- 
ing [22] . Undoubtedly, the size of the financial incentive will play 
a key role in the effectiveness of the policy. Notably, there is much 
evidence in the behavioural literature indicating that monetary in- 
centives may crowd out intrinsic motivation [4] . This suggests that 
providing monetary incentives may well be ineffective (and ren- 
der other effort s ineffective, too), if pursued in parallel to strate- 
gies that aim to create prosocial and social image incentives. For 
instance, a recent study by Kölle et al. [21] shows that providing 
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monetary incentives to register for voting reduces the perceived 
moral imperative to do so. 
Conclusion 
The different benefit and cost considerations on the individ- 
ual’s decision to comply with a public testing strategy highlight 
the complexity of designing an effective approach. Different incen- 
tives need to be taken into account to reach sufficient participation 
rates. Moreover, consideration should be given to the way specific 
subgroups of the population are incentivized, especially those that 
combine a relatively low willingness to get tested with a higher 
exposure to potential infection, such as people with less financial 
means or those that tend to not follow the rules. 
In light of the high public health and economic stakes associ- 
ated with getting the testing strategy right, as a core component 
of a successful COVID-19 policy, there is an urgent need to under- 
stand what works best, and at what cost. This calls for further re- 
search into the different behavioural responses to the alternative 
testing strategies currently discussed and implemented through- 
out the world, including practical implementation, accessibility and 
communication of the policy. On top of the short term benefits in 
the current, unprecedented COVID-19 crisis, these insights could 
inform faster and more efficient policy responses in potential fu- 
ture disease outbreaks. In addition, understanding willingness to 
participate in testing programs might shed further light on effec- 
tive ways of raising participation in other important disease con- 
trol strategies, such as vaccine campaigns [23] or health screening 
programs [19] . 
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APPENDIX A 
Details on survey data collection: 
We conducted an online-survey experiment among students of 
the University of Luxembourg (LUX-sample, N = 127) and an online 
survey among a sample of US citizens (US-sample, N = 1215). Sub- 
jects in the LUX-sample were recruited from an internal database 
using the platform ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The US-sample com- 
prises respondents from 50 different US states who were recruited, 
via the online survey platform CloudResearch, from the Turkprime 
panel, which is heterogeneous in many sociodemographic dimen- 
sions (Chandler et al., 2019). Both surveys contain an item that asks 
respondents to state their willingness to get tested for free, our 
main variable of interest (WTT). In the main text, we report re- 
sults from a probit regression of WTT on individual characteristics 
(US-sample) or a treatment indicator (LUX-sample). 
US-sample: Questionnaire 
How likely do you think you will contract COVID-19? 
◦ Extremely likely (1) 
◦ Somewhat likely (2) 
◦ Neither likely nor unlikely (3) 
◦ Somewhat unlikely (4) 
◦ Extremely unlikely (5) 
How safe do you think you are with respect to contracting 
COVID-19 after the restrictive measures taken by the State you cur- 
rently live? 
◦ Extremely safe (1) 
◦ Moderately safe (2) 
◦ Neither safe nor unsafe (3) 
◦ Moderately unsafe (4) 
◦ Extremely unsafe (5) 
How much are you following the restrictions that the State you 
currently live in imposed to contain the spread of COVID-19? 
◦ Completely (1) 
◦ Quite a lot (2) 
◦ A moderate amount (3) 
◦ Quite a little (4) 
◦ Not at all (5) 
How do you evaluate the current spread of the COVID-19 virus 
in your State? 
◦ The pandemic has just started (1) 
◦ The pandemic is before the peak (2) 
◦ The pandemic is at its peak (3) 
◦ The pandemic passed the peak (4) 
◦ The pandemic is almost over (5) 
How many of these diseases do you have? Cardiovascular dis- 







◦ or more (6) 
◦ I prefer not to answer (7) 
What is your age? 
___________________________________________________ 
In which state do you currently reside? 
 Alabama (1) ... I do not reside in the United States (53) 
In which city you currently reside? 
___________________________________________________ 
What is the highest level of school you have completed or the 
highest degree you have received? 
◦ Less than high school degree (1) 
◦ High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent in- 
cluding GED) (2) 
◦ Some college but no degree (3) 
◦ Associate degree in college (2-year) (4) 
◦ Bachelor’s degree in college (4-year) (5) 
◦ Master’s degree (6) 
◦ Doctoral degree (7) 
◦ Professional degree (JD, MD) (8) 
Choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be: 
◦ White (1) 
◦ Black or African American (2) 
◦ American Indian or Alaska Native (3) 
◦ Asian (4) 
◦ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (5) 
◦ Other (6) ______________________________________ 
What is your gender? 
◦ Male (1) 
◦ Female (2) 
◦ Other (3) 
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Please indicate includes your entire household income in (previous year) before taxes. 
◦ Less than $10,0 0 0 (1) 
◦ $10,0 0 0 to $19,999 (2) 
◦ $20,0 0 0 to $29,999 (3) 
◦ $30,0 0 0 to $39,999 (4) 
◦ $40,0 0 0 to $49,999 (5) 
◦ $50,0 0 0 to $59,999 (6) 
◦ $60,0 0 0 to $69,999 (7) 
◦ $70,0 0 0 to $79,999 (8) 
◦ $80,0 0 0 to $89,999 (9) 
◦ $90,0 0 0 to $99,999 (10) 
◦ $10 0,0 0 0 to $149,999 (11) 
◦ $150,0 0 0 or more (12) 
Which statement best describes your current employment status? 
◦ Working (paid employee) (1) 
◦ Working (self-employed) (2) 
◦ Not working (temporary layoff from a job) (3) 
◦ Not working (looking for work) (4) 
◦ Not working (retired) (5) 
◦ Not working (disabled) (6) 
◦ Not working (other) (7) ______________________________________ 
◦ Prefer not to answer (8) 
Do you smoke? 
◦ Yes (1) 
◦ No (2) 
◦ Occasionally (4) 
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party? 
◦ Republican (1) 
◦ Democratic (2) 
◦ Independent (3) 
Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal (left) to extremely 
conservative (right). Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Political Ideology () 
Suppose your State decides to offer free testing for COVID-19 on a voluntary basis to identify as many infected people as possible and 
take the necessary measures to prevent others from being infected. Would you be willing to get yourself tested? 
◦ Definitely not (1) 
◦ Likely not (2) 
◦ Not sure (3) 
◦ Likely yes (4) 
◦ Definitely yes (5) 
Display This Question: 
If Suppose your State decides to offer free testing for COVID-19 on a voluntary basis to identify as... = Not sure 
Please explain, in a few words, why you are unsure about getting tested 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Display This Question: 
If Suppose your State decides to offer free testing for COVID-19 on a voluntary basis to identify as... = Definitely not 
Or Suppose your State decides to offer free testing for COVID-19 on a voluntary basis to identify as... = Likely not 
Please explain, in a few words, why you are not willing to get tested 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
How do you see yourself: Are you a person who is generally willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please use a 
scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means you are “completely unwilling to take risks” and a 10 means you are “very willing to take risks”. You 
can also use the values in-between to indicate where you fall on the scale. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 10 (10) 11 (11) 
Completely unwilling to take risks ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Very willing to take risks 
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How do you assess your willingness to share with others without expecting anything in return? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 
0 means you are “completely unwilling to share” and a 10 means you are “very willing to share”. You can also use the values inbetween 
to indicate where you fall on the scale. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 10 (10) 11 (11) 
Completely unwilling to share ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Very willing to share 
Are you generally concerned about whether other people approve or disapprove your behavior? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 
0 means you are “not concerned at all” and a 10 means you are “very concerned”. You can also use the values in-between to indicate 
where you fall on the scale. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 10 (10) 11 (11) 
Not concerned at all ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Very concerned 
In comparison to others, are you a person who is generally willing to give up something today in order to benefit from that in the 
future? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means you are “completely unwilling to give up something today” and a 10 means you are 
“very willing to give up something today”. You can also use the values in-between to indicate where you fall on the scale. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 10 (10) 11 (11) 
Completely unwilling to give 
up something today 
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Very willing to give up something today 
Luxembourg sample: Question regarding testing method 
Testing for COVID-19 is currently organized on a voluntary basis. Several types of tests have been developed. Would you be willing to 
get yourself tested using the procedure shown below? 
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APPENDIX B 
Our probit results are obtained from the following model: 
P 
(
y i j = 1 
∣




β0 + βx i j + b j 
)
, 
Where P(y ij = 1 | x ij ,b j ) is the probability that willingness to test, 
y, is equal to 1 for individual i living in state j , given i’ s individual 
characteristics (in vector x ij ). The standard normal cumulative dis- 
tribution ( •) is defined as the inverse link function. ß is a vector 
containing the effects of the personal characteristics of i (such as 
age, risk aversion, etc.) and b j is, depending on the specification, a 
vector containing state-level fixed effects or the state-level random 
intercepts. 
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